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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH PAGE, 
Plaintiff, Appellant and 
Respondent on Cross Appeal, 
vs. 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSUR- Case No. 9903 
ANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Cross Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, an agent of the defendant insur-
ance company, seeks to recover the actual cash value 
of a war 'surplus building destroyed by fire in Feb-
ruary, 1961, under two fire insurance policies issued 
by the defendant company to the agent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWE·R COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on 
two special interrogatories. The jury found that 
the actual cash value of the building was $10,000 and 
also found that the plaintiff failed to make a full 
and honest disclosure to the defendant fire insurance 
company of the material facts regarding the nature 
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and intended use of the burned fourplex. The trial 
court thereupon entered judgment for the defendant 
of no cause of action. It then granted plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial and upon reconsidering 
granted a partial new trial only on the issue of 
the validity of the second insurance policy. From 
this judgment the plaintiff has appealed and defend-
ant has cross appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a 
new trial. Defendant seeks reversal of the trial 
court's order granting a partial new trial and asks 
that the trial court's judgment of no cause of action 
be reinstated. In the alternative that plaintiff have 
a new trial only on the i'Ssue of whether the plaintiff 
violated his fiduciary duty, when the policies of 
insurance were written, by not disclosing to the 
company the actual condition and use of said build-
Ing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has not included many facts which 
the defendant considers important in the fair pre-
sentation of its ease and will, therefore, set out its 
own statement of facts. 
The plaintiff Meredith Page had been a solicit-
ing agent for Utah Home Fire Insurance Company 
for over 30 years (R104) and worked through Heber 
J. Grant and Company, a general agent for Utah 
Home Fire Insurance Company. He also owns 22 
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rental units in Salt Lake, Riverton and Draper 
which he manages. (R105) 
In December of 1958 Mr. Page purchased a war 
surplus building used for Air Force officers quarters 
located at the Salt Lake Air base, from La Veil Web-
ster, a professional house mover. The building had 
22 rooms (R116) and approximately 4670 square 
feet of floor space. (R108). On December 31, 1958 
he went to Heber J. Grant and Company where he 
met with Mr. Ove C. Inkley, secretary and treasurer 
of Heber J. Grant and Company, who had known 
Mr. Page for 25 years (R. 284) and discussed with 
him the matter of taking out a fire insurance policy 
on the building. There is a dispute in the evidence 
with respect to what Mr. Page said he told Mr. 
Inkley and what Mr. Inkley says Mr. Page told 
him concerning the building. The jury found that 
Mr. Page failed to make an honest disclosure of the 
material facts pertaining to the nature and intended 
use of the building and defendant will point out 
the differences in testimony. Mr. Page stated that 
he told Mr. Inkley he had purchased a building of 
approximately 5,000 square feet and that he was 
going to move it out in the county on U.S. 91 at 
14610 South, immediately south of the Utah State 
Prison, (R.113) and put it on property there as a 
fourplex (R. 103); that he had paid approximately 
$2,000 for it, to be exact $1,800 (R. 109). He said it 
would be moved within two weeks to a month 
(R. 135); that it would be cut up into three or five 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pieces when .moved (R. 140); that the wiring would 
have to be cut and the pipes (R. 140); that it had a 
90 weight tar paper roof; that many of the windows 
had been broken (R. 142); that this was an Air Force 
officers' living quarters and a few minor repairs 
would put it in good condition (R. 143); that the 
floors were good and tiled throughout (R. 144); that 
the plumbing was all in and very little would have.· 
to be done to the plumbing (R. 144); that it was 
built for a central heating ~system and that he was 
going to make individual heating systems for each 
apartment; the pipe was already in, most of it, and 
it would be very little work on that (R. 144 & 145); ·. 
that he told Mr. Inkley there were closets in each 
apartment (R. 145) and that the building was in 
good condition (R. 146); he also told him the type of 
floor joists on the building and explained pretty well 
the construction and condition (R. 157). 
Mr. Inkley on the other hand testified that Mr. 
Page told him the building had a good roof, it had 
a good floor and there was tile on the floor as well 
as on the walls. The walls were hard walls, good 
substantial walls. The building was substantial all 
the way through (R. 285); he said it would be heated1 
by gas, it was wired already, the plumbing was in' 
it, he would just have to connect with the plumbing· 
and the wiring; that after he repaired some little 
damage he would have four nice rental units; that 
he was putting it on a cement foundation (R. 286). 
Mr. Inkley said Page did not mention they would 
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c:ut up the building in units for moving (R286) and 
that if he had told him he would not have forgotten 
it (R. 297). Mr. Page did not tell him a large number 
of windows were out of the building ( R. 286 & 297). 
He said Mr. Page told him that there would be a 
little wall repair near the baseboard where there 
had been some wearing, nothing extensive, however, 
(R. 286). Page also told him that the light fixtures, 
plumbing fixtures and heating fixtures were in, the, 
building had been occupied and he was purchasing 
the building just as it stood when it was vacated 
and that everything was in the building when he 
bought it. (R. 287). 
Mr. Inkley on cross examination by Mr. Dahl 
stated as follows with respect to his conversation 
with Mr. Page and the question of insurability of 
the building: 
"Well, when Mr. Page first mentioned it, 
I was in somewhat of a doubt but as he went 
on to explain what he had there, my doubts 
left me, he apparently had a good property." 
(R. 293 L30, 294 L 1 & 2) 
When Mr. Inkley referred the matter to the under-
writer he states he told the underwriter what Mr. 
Page had told him and that he understood the build-
ing would be moved intact (R. 89). He further testi-
~~ fied that if he had known the building wa'S to be cut 
W in pieces to move, that many of the window panes 
1~ ·were missing, that some of the walls were in poor 
!). repair, that some of the plumbing was missing; that 
~~ the heating unit was not in the building, the wiring 
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was not complete and that the building would be 
vacant for some time, he would have told Page that 
it was doubtful the building could be insured and 
that he would have passed the information along 
and that it would be referred to their underwriter, 
Mr .. Everett, and probably also Mr. Neil Mann, the 
underwriter for Utah Home Fire Insurance Com-
pany. 
Mr. Mann testified that had the matter been 
referred to him with the information that the build-
ing was being cut into pieces to be moved, that many. 
of the windows were out, that the wiring would be~, 
cut, roofing, plumbing and heating lines cut, that' 
some of the walls were in poor condition with holes 
in them and that the building was going to be moved: 
20 miles, the policy would not have been written 
"It would not have been written because 
the rate used wouldn't reflect the hazards in-
volved. The rate used was 97 cents per $1,000. 
Insurance companies statistically compute 
rates based on hazards, based on experience. 
The experiece involved in buildings cut up, 
vacant, unoccupied, with broken windows is 
so muchworse than a completed building that 
we could not. The rate we would quote would 
be so high that the insured would not ask for 
insurance. In other words, the rate of 97 cents 
is based on a completed fourplex with no re-
pairs needed; that we would quote." (R. 299 
& 300). 
Mr. Everett, the underwriter for Heber J. Grant 
and Company, also testified that the risk would 
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have been rejected if the information that the build-
ing was to be cut up, moved, many of the windo'v 
panes missing, the walls damaged and the wiring 
and plumbing cut, had been conveyed to him at the 
time the application for insurance was made. 
After some discussion as to the amount of in-
surance to be placed on the building plaintiff applied 
for $20,000 with the statement that after he did 
some more work on it he would take 1nore insurance 
(R. 110). The policy was issued Dec. 31, 1958 show-
ing the building located a:t 14610 South State Street 
and signed by Meredith Page as agent (R. 3) (Exh. 
1P). 
The building was moved in about April of 1959 
(R. 149 & 150) to a point just south of the State 
Prison and within 12-15 feet of another fourplex 
owned by Page. (R. 177) 
After it was moved and set on a foundation 
of cement and cinderblocks, with the blocks just 
being laid one on top of the other without cement 
(R148), the plaintiff had the window panes put in, 
covered up the cuts on the roof "'~ith tin and had 
a neighbor teen-age boy paint the outside (R. 173 
& 273). He also ~started to extend the eaves on the 
building and had them about one-half done when 
the building burned (R. 246). There were some holes 
in the floor, other than the cuts and within a few feet 
of them. He claimed to have done a lot of work on 
the building including installation of some new 
doors on inside and outside (R. 117-119). 
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However, Mr. Welchman, a tenant of Mr. 
Pages's who lived immediately next to the burned 
building and resided there at the time of trial 
(R. 174) who was the only one who did any carpen-
try work on the building (R. 159 & 249) and the 
only person who had a key to the building other 
than Mr. Page (R. 177 & 253), testified that he 
did the work on the roof (R. 244); that he patched 
the rseams on the roof where the cuts were made 
by nailing tin strips over the roof cuts to keep the 
rain out (R. 249); that some of the walls were 
badly damaged (R. 248) ; that they were just re-
paired enough to plug up holes so one could store 
things in them and keep the kids out (R. 246) and 
that no permanent repairs had been made on them 
at all (R. 246 & 249). The floors had not been 
repaired rso that they hold together where they 
had been cut; that three-fourths of the window 
panes were out (R. 247 & 265) which he and Mr. 
Page installed (R. 249) and that about one-half 
of the extension on the eave had been co1npleted at 
the time of the fire. No roofing had been put on 
the eaves that had been completed (R. 246). The 
doors on the building could not be locked and kids 
ran through the building, but the doors and locks 
were eventually repaired ( R. 246) ; possibly two 
were replaced (R. 247). No plumbing work was 
done on the building (R 252). Some of the cup-
boards in the apartments were in very bad shape 
(R. 252). The floors had coverings on them. How-
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ever, in some places it was torn up and in pretty 
bad shape (R. 253). No work had been done on the 
rafters of the building (R. 252). Mr. Page and Mr. 
Welchman had a falling out and Mr. Welchman quit 
working for Mr. Page. However, later Mr. Page 
gave Mr. Welchman his key back and Mr. Welchman· 
did a little more work for Mr. Page. He continued, 
to live in the building next to the burned fourplex. 
and was around there all the time as he was un-
employed. He stated he didn't know of any addi-
tional work being done during thi'S period (R. 272). 
In accordance with Mr. Page's statement at the· 
time he took the first policy, he applied for an addi-
tional $10,000 which was written on June 27, 1960. 
He stated that he called the order in on the phone, 
told the person he talked to that he spent a con-
siderable amount of money and work and at the 
time he took out the original policy he was going 
to add to the insurance on the building. He stated 
that they then okayed the policy (R. 110 & 137).' 
The company did not send anyone out to see the 
property but relied on Mr. Page''S examination and 
representation as to the condition of the building 
(R. 137 & 151). Mr. Page was the only one who 
made any appraisal or inspection of the building 
( R. 137). He again signed the policy as agent ( R. 5) 
(Exh. P. 2). 
A fire occurred involving a small outbuilding 
about 40 feet from tho fourplex. The small building 
had been constructed before the Air Force building 
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was ever moved to the site where it later burned 
(R. 264). Mr. Page had a policy of insurance on the 
building next to the fourplex which burned (See 
Exh. 7, 8 & 11P) but he as agent told the agent from 
General Adustment Bureau, an independent adjust-
ing agency, who came out to adjust the loss, which 
policy to charge the loss of the small building to. 
Mr. Page said it wa'S closer to the fourplex that 
later burned so he attacned the loss to the policy 
on it (R. 152 & 156). 
After the pre-trial on March 6, 1962, d~fendant 
filed a motion for leave to amend the pre-trial order 
to include a defense of fraud and misrepresentation, 
pursuant to admissions in Mr. Page's deposition. 
'The pre-trial Judge after discussion between counsel 
and the court ruled that part of the claimed fraud, 
if it existed, was against the state and would not 
be admissible in this case but that the question of 
whether Mr. Page violated his fiduciary C:uty to 
the company would be an issue in the case and as 
noted in the amended pre-trial order, dated March 
30, 1962, counsel agreed that the issue could be pre-
sented at the trial (R. 17, 18 & 19). 
Each party had three expert witnesses testify 
concerning the actual cash value of the building: 
Ronald Sylvester for the plaintiff, $38,430.00 (R. 
188 & 193) John W. New, for the plaintiff, $33,718.39 
(R202 & 222); Sam F. Soter, for the plaintiff, $27,-
804.24 (R .. 222 & 230). The plaintiff''S witnesses were 
all contractors and none of them were qualified ap-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
praislll's. The defendant's expert witnesses were 
Alex Gray, $2--1,780.16 (R. 274 & 283 & 297-298); 
Raymond S. Fletcher, $7,500 (R. 308 & 334); and 
Guy D. Adler, $7,500 (R. 335 & 343). Mr. Gray's 
bid did not take into consideration depreciation but 
was only the cost of rebuilding the structure with 
new materials (R. 277 & 298), and wa'S not claimed 
to be the actual cash value of the building at the 
time of the fire. The witnesses Fletcher and Alder 
were qualified appraisers both b2ing 1nembers of 
the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers 
and both with .many years of experience in the field 
of appraising (R. 309-310) (Exh. 2D). Mr. Alder 
was also president of the Utah Society of Residential 
Appraisers, S.R.A. (R. 335). Each of them made 
a thorough study of the structure of the building 
and took into consideration the various elements of 
depreciation and obsolescence in arriving at the 
actual cash value of the building. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, OR THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER OR NOT MR. PAGE VIOLATED HIS FIDU-
CIARY DUTY WAS A PROPER ISSUE BEFORE THE 
TRIAL 'COURT AND JURY AND A PROPE'R MATTER 
OF DEFENSE. 
It is discretionary with the pre-trial judge as 
to whether additional issues not pleaded in the orig-
inal pleadings may be added at time of the pre-trial 
hearing. In this case the plaintiff not only was put 
on notice in plenty of time, 26 days, before the actual 
11 
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trial, but as stated in the amended pre-trial order: 
"Counsel have agreed that the following 
issue may be presented at the trial***" 
"It is stipulated that the plaintiff Page 
was the agent of the insurance company at 
the time of the placement of this policy and 
worked through the general agent Heber J. 
Grant and Company. Defendant contends 
that in so dealing he owed a fiduciary rela-
tionship (duty) to the insurance company and 
thus being interested in the result of the 
transaction he violated his duty towards 
them.'' 
The record is clear that the pre-trial judge listed 
as one of the issues the question whether l\ir. Page 
violated his fiduciary duty in the placeinent of the 
policies. This was, therefore, a proper issue before 
the tria!l court. 
Defendant claimed in its motion that Page pur-
chased the building and placed it on an area of 
land which he knew was going to be taken by the 
State Road Commission for a highway and that he 
purchased the policies of insurance in large amounts 
to try to substantiate the values which he proposed 
to collect from the State. Mr. Page's deposition 
contained admissions pertaining to this but the pre-
trial judge ruled that this proposed fraud, if any, 
would not constitute a defense to the defendant on 
the policies issued to Page. 
The fiduciary duty of Mr. Page a:s an agent 
was discussed and Judge Van Cott, the pre-trial 
12 
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judge, said he would make the question of the viola-
tion of the fiduciary duty an issue in the case, which 
was done. 
It has been common practice in pre-trial pro-
cedure in Salt Lake County to set up additional 
issues not set up in the pleadings when the facts 
warranted it. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes the court to do so and a proper 
order was made in this case. 
Plaintiff was not surprised or should not have 
been concern'ing this defense in this case because 
although he objected to the original pre-trial order 
being amended he did consent to the issue being 
presented at trial (R. 19). The trial judge readily 
recognized that this issue had been raised by the 
amended pre-trial order (R. 94-95). Counsel fori 
defendant prepared an instruction on the issue· 
which was presented to the court prior to the com-
mencement of the trial (R. 30) and plaintiff's coun-
sel also recognized that it was an issue because he 
stated to Judge Faux: 
"The plaintiff objects again as it did in 
the amended pre-trial order of the inclusion 
of the question as to whether or not the fiduc-
iary capacty of the insured and the agent 
creates a defense on the policy itself." (R. 94). 
Defendant never did waive this defense. The de-
fendant contended that the agent made his own 
appraisal or in other words inspection or surveil-
lance of the building and the policies were issued 
on his representation as agent. Valuation with re-
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
spect to the amount to be paid under the policy is 
governed by the terms of the policy and is based on 
actual cash value. 
Section 13 of the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency states as follows with respect to an agent's 
fiduciary duty: 
"An agent is a fiduciary with respect to 
matters within the scope of his agency." 
Comment A. 
"The agreement to act on behalf of the 
principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary; 
that is, a person having a duty created by his 
undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit 
of another in matters connected with his un-
dertaking. Among the agent's fiduciary duties 
to the principal is the duty to * * * * deal 
fairly with the principal in all transactions 
with him." 
Seeton 390 of the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency states as follows in connection with the 
agent acting as an adverse party with the principal's 
consent: 
"An agent in dealing with the principal 
on his own account in regard to subject matter 
as to which he is employed is subject to a 
duty to deal fairly with the principal and to 
communicate to him all material facts in con-
nection with the transaction of which he has 
ndtice, unless the principal has manifested 
that he knows such facts or that he does not 
care to know them." 
Comment A. Facts to be disclosed. 
"One employed as agent violates no duty 
14 
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to the principal by acting for his own benefit 
if he makes a full disclosure of the facts to an 
acquiescent principal and takes no unfair ad-
vantage of him. Before dealing with the 
principal on his own account, however, an 
agent has a duty, not only to make no misstate-
ments of fact but also to disclose to the prin-
cipal all material facts fully and completely. 
A fact is material within the meaning of the 
rule stated in this section if it is one the 
agent should realize would be likely to affect 
the judgment of the principal in giving his 
consent to the agent to enter into the partic-
ular transaction on the specified terms. 
Hence, the disclosure must include not only 
the fact that the agent is acting on his own 
account, but also all other facts which he 
should realize have or are likely to have a 
bearing upon the desirability of the transac-
tion from the viewpoint of the principal." 
Comment B. Facts which agent should know. 
"The duty is positive so that although 
the agent is inadvertent and non negligent 
in failing to reveal material facts in his pos-
session the transaction is voidable by a prin-
cipal ignorant of them." 
Section 387 of the Restatement of Agency cov-
ering duties of loyalty states as follows: 
"An agent is subect to a duty to his prin-
cipal to act solely for the benefit of the prin-
cipal in all matters connected with the 
agency." 
Comment B. Scope of duty. 
"The agent's duty is not only to act solely 
15 
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for the benefit of the principal in matte~s 
entrusted to him but also to take no unfair 
advantage of his position in the. use o~ ~hings 
acquired by him because of his position as 
agent or because of the opportunities which 
his position affords." 
Comment F, under Section 390, states as fol-
lows: 
"The burden of proof is on the agent to 
show that the principal was informed of all 
material facts and that the transaction was 
fair." 
In the case of Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan & Trust 
Company, Utah 1935, 87 U t. 364 49 P (2) 403, the 
Utah court in analyzing the case stated: 
"it is true that upon the establishment of 
certain fiduciary relationships and transac-
tions between the parties to that relationship 
equity will presume fraud, the abuse of con-
fidence, and will place the burden of proving 
good faith and fairness upon the don1inant 
party in the relationship. In such cases, the 
presumption of fraud may be based upon the 
relationship alone, and relieves the party from 
proving the fraud, but the fraud is, neverthe-
less, an essential element. By the presump-
tion equity supplies that element. The rela-
tionship wherein such presumptions have been 
indulged are * * * principal and agent. In oth-
er cases 1the presumption of fraud has been 
given effect when there has been a relationship 
of confidence plus other circumstances tending 
to show that son1e advantage has been taken 
by the dominant party with the consequent 
abuse of confidence." 
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Plaintiff has cited on Page 10 of his brief 20A 
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice, 11978, 
concerning misrepresentations and the burden of 
proof. The rule set forth therein is not applicable 
where an agent in fiduciary capacity deals with the 
principal on his own account. As set forth in the 
Restatement of Agency, Section 390, Comment F, 
Supra: 
"The burden shifts to the agent to show 
that the transaction was fair in all respects 
and that he did not take unfair advantage 
of his principal." 
Utah has followed this principle of law in several 
cases: In addition to the Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan 
& Trust Company, Case, Supra, see Hawkins vs. 
Perry, Utah, 123 Ut. 16 253 P(2) 372, Peterson vs. 
Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 216, In Re Swans Estate, 
(4 Utah (2) 277) (293 P(2) 682). 
The authorities which plaintiff has cited with 
respect to imputing the knowledge of the agent to 
the insurer are not applicable where the insured is 
the agent himself. If the rules quoted by plaintiff 
were applicable to this situation, then one could 
not rely upon or trust ones own agent. Mr. Page 
had been an agent for over 30 years. The general 
agent had a right to rely on him to disclose fully 
all rna terial facts pertaining to the transaction at 
all times. 
Page's duty in acting as an agent in selling this 
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policy on his own property was to get for the in-
surance company the terms most favorable for the 
company considering the risk involved. For himself, 
he was interested in getting the best rate he could 
for himself. There was a definite conflict of inter-
ests. Under the circumstances it was his duty to 
fully disclose every material fact which would affect 
the company's judgment with respect to whether 
or not they would write the risk at all and if so, the 
rate that would be charged. Mr. Page secured an 
agent's commission for selling those policies to him-
self. 
In the case of Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-· 
pany vs. McGreavy, 118 Fed. (2) 115, an insurance 
agent issued a policy to himself on a warehouse). 
purchased by him a few days before for $500. He· 
reported the insurance to the company with the 
statement that the building was worth from $3,500 
to $4,000 but did not disclose his recent pl.1rchase. 
nor the fact that the building had been erected as: 
a creamery and had been put to various uses, none 
of which proved profitable. The con1pany's instruc-
tions to its agents were to consider risks with ref-
erence 'to their moral hazard and not to /issue a 
policy for an amount the insured would rather have 
than the risk covered, and if a building was badly 
located, too large or in a business not adapted to it, 
not to write it. In that case they held in an :action on 
the policy after the loss that the materiality of the 
agent's concealment was so obvious as to be decided 
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as a matter of law and it was error to submit it 
to a jury. In our ca:se the jury found that Page 
knowingly failed to make a full and honest dis; 
closure of the material facts. His concealment makes 
the policy voidable. 
Plaintiff contends that even though he may 
have been guilty of fraud or violated his fiduciary 
duty as an agent, the general agent, even though 
it wasn't advised by Page of all the facts, waived 
the fraud or violation of duty on behalf of Utah 
Home Fire Insurance Company and in addition wa:s 
put on notice of all facts which Page as soliciting 
agent failed to reveal to the general agent. The 
soliciting agent and the general agent were both 
under a duty to reveal facts to Utah Home Fire 
Insurance Company and Utah Home Fire Insurance 
Company had a right to rely on both agents. 
Section 9104 of Volume 16, Appleman Insurance 
Lavv and Practice, pertaining to local, soliciting and 
sub-agents states as follows: 
"Ordinarily, notice to or knowledge of a 
solicting agent of an insurance company re-
ceived while acting within the scope of his 
authority and performance of his duties, is 
chargeable to the insurer. Acts and know-
ledge of a local agent concerning property in-
sured against fire at the time the policy was 
executed is imputable to the insurer. And the 
rule of imputed knowledge is applied with 
particular force as to such information a 
soliciting agent receives while engaged in 
solici'ting insurance or preparing the applica-
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion, prior to the execution of the policy. The 
insurer is not only bound by hi'S knowledge at 
such times, but also by his acts and repre-
sentations in connection therewith. 
It is the duty of an agent authorized by 
an insurance company to solicit and transmit 
applications for insurance, to prepare such 
applications, so as accurately to state there-
sult of the negotiations, and his failure so to 
do is in legal effect the fault of the company. 
The knowledge of an agent soliciting and col-
lecting premiums of facts justifying the in-
surer in forfeiting a policy is binding upon 
i't, though not communicated. So, when a soli~ 
citing agent has knowledge of facts, received 
by him prior to the execution of the policy, 
which would render the policy void ab initio 
or justify the insurer in declaring a forfeiture 
thereof, a company thereafter issuing the 
policy cannot avoid liability at some subse~ 
quent date upon such ground." 
Mr. Page was a soliciting agent without any ques~ 
tion, and he signed the policies which were issued 
to him as agent. The rule just quoted by counsel is 
similar to the rule pertaining 'to a general agent. On 
the basis of Mr. Dahl's argument, the knowledge of 
Page would, therefore, be imputed to the insurance 
company, but certainly this could not be so because 
this would protect the agent in perpetrating and 
accomplishing a fraud upon the insurance company. 
The rule is that the agent n1ust disclose every mater-
ial fact to the company in order to clear himself 
of any imputation of fraud. While there may not 
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have been any actual fraud upon the part of 
Heber J. Grant and Company, certainly there ap-
pears to be some collusion here if the facts as stated 
by the witnesses were true. This collusion would 
not relieve Mr. Page from the fraud upon his part 
of the violation of his fiduciary duty. In Volume 16, 
Appleman on Insurance, Section 9104 beginning on 
Page 646, it is stated: 
"The rule of imputed knowledge is gener-
ally followed, in the absence of fraud or col-
lusion between the agent and those taking in-
surance." (Boldface ours.) 
Under the circumstances of the Page case it is sub-
mitted that neither Mr. Page's knowledge nor the 
knowledge of the Heber J. Grant and Company 
would be imputed to Utah Home Fire Insurance 
Company in view of the violation of the fiduciary 
duty upon the part of Mr. Page and upon the part 
perhaps of the I-IeLer J. Grant and Con1pany. 
In the case of Harland vs. Liverpool and L. & G. 
Insurance Company, 192 Mo. App. 198, 180 S.W. 
998, an agent's failure to make a full disclosure of 
all the facts rendered the policy voidable at the 
option of the insurer. The agent bought a stock 
of certain goods at an administrator's sale for $425 
or $450; he was one of the appraisers who had ap-
praised the stock for the administrator, and this 
appraisement fixed the value thereof at $555.35; 
after purchasing the stock and adding thereto other 
goods of a comparatively small amount in value, he 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issued a policy to himself for $900 on the stock, 
admittedly worth that much and more; he sent a 
copy of the policy to the insurer, and it with know-
ledge that he was the insured, assented to his having 
insured himself; and while he had shown the stock 
to the insurer's general agent, at whose suggestion 
he issued the policy, and had told the latter the 
stock invoiced at $700 or $800, but that he bought 
it at administration sale for less, he did not disclose 
that he had appraised the property, nor the amount 
of such appraisement, nor the price he paid. It was 
held that neither the partial disclosure of these facts 
made by the agent to the insurer's general agent, 
nor the fact that the property may have been in 
reality worth more than $900, the amount for which 
it was insured, absolved him from his duty as an 
agent to make a full disclosure of what he did pay 
and all the facts concerning the stock. 
Plaintiff claims on page 14 of his brief that the 
only testimony opposing Mr. Page's testimony as to 
the condition of the building as recited in R. 108-110 
is the testimony of Mr. Inkley and that Mr. Inkley's 
memory was bad. Mr. Page's testimony as set forth 
on pages 108-110 of the record was changed greatly 
on cross examination (R. 135-183). Mr. W·elchman's 
testimony was also greatly in conflict with Mr. 
Page's testimony as to the condition of the building 
(R. 244-253). Defendant's counsel would al'so point 
out to the court that a demand was made at the time 
of the taking of his deposition for the invoices and 
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checks covering Mr. Page's expenditures on the 
building (R. 163) which he claimed was in the neigh-
borhood of $6,000 (R. 165). He acknowledged he 
received invoices for his purchases at the time of 
the purchase but stated that he threw the invoices 
away at the end of each year and kept his cancelled 
checks (R. 161, 162). However, he was unable to 
identify the particular checks with any particular 
purchase and on cross examination admitted the fol-
lowing discrepancies: Claimed that he paid La Veil 
Webster $1,800 for the building including the moving 
thereof, when in fact the checks totalled $1,600 {R. 
136) ; claimed he paid Welchman $1,000 (R. 166) ; 
his checks, however, totaled $153 (R. 167), but he 
claimed then that he had allo·wed him credit on rent 
for a few hundred dollars, not to exceed $500; he 
furnished two checks for having gas run in the 
vicinity of the premises totaling $163.50 but on cross 
exa1nination achnitted that only $100 was for thi'S 
building and that the balance was for the fourplex 
in the vicinity of the one that burned, and also that 
a refund was made to him from the amount paid 
(R. 169); a check was also furnished payable to an 
E. Moreau for $40 which Page also admitted was 
not for the building (R. 169); there was another 
check for sand and gravel which was issued almost 
a year after the building was burned which Page 
also admitted could not be traced to the building 
(R. 169). Plaintiff's counsel admitted that the checks 
might not be the ones for the particular building as 
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did Mr. Page (R. 162, 163}. There were many other 
points where Mr. Page's testimony conflicted with 
the testimony of other witnesses and his own pre-
vious testi'mony, and i1t was not surprising that the 
jury found that he failed to make an honest disclo-
sure of material facts to the defendant company. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM·1\1:IT ERROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO TH·E JURY. 
The court's instruction 11 (a) was not erroneous 
but properly instructed the jury of the element'S to 
take into consideration in determining actual cash 
value. As stated by appellants counsel, the definition 
of actual cash value as it applies to fire insurance 
policies on buildings has not been decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The instruction as given is as follows: 
"In determining the actual cash value 
of the burned fourplex you may consider the 
following factors based upon the evidence 
which has been presented and accepted during 
the course of the trial: The size of the build-
ing, the kind and quality of material of which 
it was constructed, the replace1nent cost with 
proper allowance for depreciation and deter-
iora!ti'on from use, age and other like causes, 
the manner of wear and tear to which the 
building had been subjected, its state of repair 
at the time of the loss, the obsolescence, both 
structural and functional, the neighborhood 
in which the building was located, the rental 
value and all other relevant facts and circum-
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stances in evidence which affected the value 
of the property." (R. 45) 
Plaintiff's experts all testified as to the value 
by taking the cost of const111cting the building new, 
on the basis of materials of which Mr. Page said it 
was constructed, less depreciation on the basis of a 
chart. On cross examination Mr. Page had to admit 
that many of the materials he claimed were used in 
the building were in error. None of the plaintiff's 
witnesses took into consideration the actual condi-
tion of the building at the time of the fire as de-
veloped by the various witnesses, but determined the 
value based on a building in good condition. They 
likewise did not take into consideration the location 
of the building just south of the prison immediately 
adjacent to an automobile salvage yard and many 
other factors. In order to arrive at the actual cash 
value it would be necessary to properly consider 
these various elements and the court properly ad-
vised the jury that they could take into consideration 
these factors. 
IThe appraisers Fletcher and Alder cal1ed by the 
defendant to testify concerning the actual cash value 
each testified that they approached the problem 
using three different methods of valuation, to-wit: 
Cost approach, market approach and income ap-
proach, and that from these three they correlated 
the values and arrived at a final figure. (R. 310, 311, 
337, 338). The value of the building was not based 
on market value a:s claimed by counsel for plaintiff 
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but on actual cash value as determined by their 
appraisals using the three methods of approach. The 
factors set forth in the instruction were all covered 
by various witnesses and properly admitted as evi-
dence. The instruction was, therefore, proper. 
"In recent years there has been a ten-
dency on the part of a substantial number of 
courts to reject reproduction or replacement 
cost or market value as the 'Sole test or criteria 
of the actual cash value of the buildings. These 
courts have relied upon what might be termed 
the 'broad evidence rule' under which the 
courts will receive any evidence logically tend-
ing to show actual cash value." ( 61 ALR (2) 
729, sub paragraph C.) 
There follo·ws after said paragraph a number of 
jurisdictions following this rule. On page 728 of 61 
ALR (2) it is stated: 
"Many courts although rejecting repro-
duction or replacement cost less depreciation 
as the sole test of the actual cash value of an 
insured building, have recognized that it con-
stitutes evidence of such value." 
The states following the Idaho decision of Boise As-
sociation of Credit Men vs. U. S. Fire Insurance 
Company, 256 Pac. 523, appear to be in the great 
minority and this Idaho case is an old case. The 
rule 'Sought to be invoked by plaintiff would be man-
ifestly unfair if used under circumstances involving 
a building in a state of disrepair and poor loca:tion 
as the building of the plaintiffs herein. 
The jury did not accept as the actual cash value 
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what any one 'vitness testified to but arrived at 
their own figure in between plaintiff''S and defend-
ant's figures. Defendant submits that there was no 
error ·with respect to the court's instruction on 
actual cash value. 
It is discretionary with the court as to whether 
to submit the case on special interrogatories or on 
a general verdict. Rule 49 Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that the court may require a jury 
to return only a special verdict in the form of a 
special written finding upon each issue of fact and 
further that if the court omits any issue of fact 
raised by pleadings or the evidence each party 
waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so 
omitted unless before the jury retires he demand~ 
its submission to the jury or as to an issuse omitted 
without such den1and the court 1nay make a finding, 
or if it fails to do so it shall be deemed to have made 
a finding in accord with the judgment on the 'Special 
verdict. 
The plaintiff was not deprived of a jury trial by 
reason of the court's sub1nission of the case to the 
jury on special interrogatories. 
The second special interrogatory required the 
jury to make a special finding as to whether or not 
Page knowingly failed to make a full and honest 
disclosure to the defendant fire insurance company 
of the material facts regardig the nature and in-
tended use of the burned fourplex. 
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Plaintiff now complains that the court did not 
distinguish in this interrogatory between the nature 
or condition of the building at the time of the issu-
ance of the first policy and the condition at the time 
of the second policy. It was not until after the trial 
was completed that plaintiff attempted Ito distin-
guish between policies at all. 
As far as Meredith Page was concerned he took 
out the original policy and a'S he explained originally 
when he took out the first policy he would do some 
work on the building and then take some more in-
surance. (R. 110). At the time he took the $10,000 
policy he told whoever he ta1ked to on the phone that 
he spent a considerable amount of money and work 
and at the time he took out the original policy he 
was going to add to the insurance on the building. 
This policy was not to replace the original policy. 
In fact, Mr. Page himself said that the policy was 
issued on the basis of what he had represented to 
them (R. 157). His testimony was as follows: 
"Q. Now at the time you requested the 
second policy all you did was telephone it in, 
was it not, and ask them to put an additional 
$10,000 on the building. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall who you talked to on 
that occasion? 
A. No, I don't. It was never anyone who 
-Ove Inckley, or it could be Mr. Taylor, it 
could be Mr. Everett or anyone in the office. 
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Q. Now that policy then wa:s put on by 
you as an agent, you were the only one who 
made any inspection of the building down to 
that time? 
A. Yes, I explained over the phone that 
I did spend a considerable amount of money 
and work and at the time I took out the orig-
inal policy that I was going to add to the in-
surance on this building, when I did some 
work and they said that was okay. 
Q. That would be on the basis 'still of 
what you had represented to them? 
A. That's right." (R. 156, 157) 
There was no reason for the court to distinguish 
between the policies especially in view of the fact 
that counsel for the plaintiff had made no attempt 
to distinguish between them. However, Mr. Page 
still owed a fiduciary duty to the insurance company 
at that time and by his own statement as to what he 
told the person to \\' ho1n he talked he did not disclose 
the condition of the building. According to the evi-
dence the building at that time had only about half 
of the eaves constructed, no roofing paper had been 
put on the extended eaves, some of the walls \vere 
still badly damaged, no permanent repairs had been 
made, tin had been placed over roof cuts, the floor 
cuts had not been repaired, the wiring had not been 
repaired no plumbing work had been done, some of 
the cupboards \vere in bad shape, no work had been 
done on the rafters in the building, and the coverings 
on the floors were torn up and in pretty bad shape 
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in some places (R. 244-253). Mr. Page himself ad-
mitted many of these things but he still failed to 
reveal this information to the company or its general 
agent. 
The instructions submitted to the jury had to 
be based on the relationship that existed between 
Mr. Page and the defendant ·company and the in-
struction properly presented to the jury the question 
of whether or not 'Mr. Page made a full and honest 
disclosure to the defendant company of the material 
facts which it was his duty to do. However, plaintiff 
is asking that this relationship te disregarded and 
that rules of law appl'icable to the usua1 policyholder, 
not an agent of the company, be applied. The trial 
court did not mention fraud in its instruction al-
though the acts of the agent did in fact constitute 
a fraud on the company and make the policy voidable 
under the terms of the policy itself which provided 
that: 
"This entire policy shall be void if, 
whether before or after a loss, the insured 
has wilfully concealed or misrepresented any 
material fact or circum'Stance concerning this 
insurance or the subJect thereof, or the inter-
est of the insured therein, or in case of any 
fraud or false swearing by the insured relat-
ing thereto." (Exibits 1 P, 2P). 
The defendant was ·entitled to a directed verdict 
as a matter of law on the basis of the evidence and 
the plantiff was certainly not prejudiced by the in-
structions given to the jury which though perhaps 
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not as con1plete as may be desirable, nevertheless 
fairly presented the issues to the jury. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS JUDG-
MENT IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
The trial court did not invade the province of 
the jury by making its own findings of fact with 
respect to violation of plaintiff's fiduciary duty as 
to the issuance of the second policy. Neither counsel 
asked for an instruction with respect to the second 
policy. As previously stated, rule 49 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if counsel 
fails to request an instruction on an issue raised 
by the pleadings or the evidence the court may make 
its own findings. On the basis of this rule the court 
properly made a finding that Meredith Page failed 
to disclose the condition of the building to the de-
fendant company at the time of the issuance of the 
second policy ·and that the policy was, therefore, void-
ed as was the first policy. (R. 49, 50). 
Subsequently the court announced it would 
grant a new trial but the order was never entered 
and on motion to reconsider the court entered an 
order granting a partial new trial on the issue of the 
second policy only. 
The defendant contends that there was clear 
evidence that the plaintiff violated his fiduciary 
duty with respect to both policies and that the 
court's judgment of no cause of action was proper 
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and should stand, but that if plaintiff i'S ·entitled to 
have any part of the case reconsidered that the 
question of the actual cash value of the building has 
been fairly determined by the jury, and that this 
issue should no long·er be in doubt. A good portion 
of the trial time, and much of the trial expense was 
incurred in connection with the 'Six expert witnesses 
called to testify as to this phase of the case. 
Our Rule 59 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure states as follows: 
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues." * * * * * 
(Boldface ours.) 
In Moore's Federal Practice, Second Edition, 
Volume 6, Page 3761, under Rule 59.06, Partial New 
Trials, it is stated as follows pertaining to the rule 
invol'Ved: 
"On a motion for new trial, therefore, the 
trial court has discretion in both jury and 
non-jury cases to order that the new trial be 
had on all or part of the is'Sues and as to all or 
any of the parties. As we shall see, this may 
only be done, however, if the issues as to 
'vhich the new trial is ordered are so distinct 
and independent from the re'St of the case that 
they may be s·eparately tried without in-
justice. If the determination as to a certain 
issue or as to less than all of the parties is 
not fairly severable from the rest of the case, 
but i~s interwoven with the remaining issues, 
the court may not order a partial re-trial. A 
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constructive analysis of the use of the partial 
new trial in jury cases appears in Yates vs. 
Dann. In this case a seaman sued his em-
ployer for personal injuries sustained in the 
course of employment. The case was submit-
ted to the jury with instructions to answer 
certain interrogatories. The jury rendered 
a verdict for the plaintiff in a sum represent-
ing past earnings, but no award was made for 
pain and suffering and future impairment of 
earning capacity. The plaintiff's motion for 
new trial limited to the issue of damage was 
gran ted. Chief Judge Leahy, in an excellent 
opinion, stated: 'Under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 59, the trial judge has dis-
cretion to order a partial new trial as to one 
or more issues where it appears the issue in 
question is severable from and not interwoven 
with the remaining issues.' The theory behind 
this rule is a party who has already had his 
day in court as to a particular issue may not 
have another opportunity to relitigate the 
same point unless a partial new trial will 
result in a miscarriage of injustice. I think 
FR 59 was intended to prevent the re-trial 
of any issue already properly decided, and to 
limit any new trial only to those issues which 
are incorrectly decided or not decided at all. 
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, courts have indicated a trend 
to limiting re-trials to specifc issues whenever 
possible, particularly in personal injury cases 
where the issue of damages is independent 
from that relating to liability. 
Defendant here has had a fair trial on the 
issue of liability, and it would be, I think, 
obviously grossly unfair to plaintiff as well as 
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contrary to the spirit of FR 59, to require a 
re-trial of the question of defendant's culp-
ability which has already been decided by the 
jury in plaintiff's favor. Moreover, as Judge 
Kirkpatrick pointed out in the Tompkin's 
ca:se, a gra:ve injustice would appear to a plain-
tiff if, having supmitted the question of 
liability to a jury, and having obtained a fav-
orable verdict, plaintiff should be compelled 
to risk another trial, with a possibility of an 
adverse verdict, solely because the jury failed 
to make into consideration all of the elements 
of damage as clearly instructed by the court.' 
As was done in Yates, supra, the partial 
new trial device is often used to limit the new 
trial to the issue of damages where liability 
has been competently determined by the jury, 
and the damage issue is not interwoven with 
the liability issue. On the other hand, if the 
amount of the damages may not be deter-
mined wi1thout a redetern1'ination of the liabil-
ity issue a new trial as to all of the issues 
must be ordered. 
Where the issue of damages is determined 
satisfactorily to the trial court, the court may 
order a new trial limited to the issue of liabil-
ity. In Calaf 'vs. Fernandez, the suit was for 
breach of contract for the sale of land, and 
the jury awarded plaintiff approximately 
$21,000 in damages. The trial court ordered 
a new trial limited to the issue of the title to 
the property. On appeal, the first circuit af-
firmed, and stated: 'It is not an unusual 
thing to order a new trial upon a particular 
branch of a controversy. It often happens, 
where a defeated party is aggrieved by the 
phase of a trial which had to do with the 
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damages, that the verdict is set aside in that 
respect and a new trial ordered upon the 
question of damages only; and it sometimes 
happens, where the grieViance has reference to 
the primary right- that of recovery- and 
where there is no substantial controversy as 
to the question of damages, if the right of 
recovery is established, that the verdict is set 
aside upon the question of right of recovery 
only, and the scope of the trial limited accord-
ingly. The question as to what should be done 
in a given case under a motion for new trial, 
in whole or in part, is always largely a ques-
tion of discretion. The practice of not going 
over unnecessary grounds which at the end 
of the first trial and the verdict are found 
not to involve substantial dispute, and trying 
again questions that are not in substantial 
controversy through the instrumentality of a 
new trial, granted in the exercise of discre-
tion, is a salutary one, and the authorities 
and the textbooks sufficiently sustain it." 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRE'D IN GRANTING A PARTIAL 
NE\V TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF 
THE SECOND POLICY PURCHASED BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF FROM THE DEFENDANT. 
The issue raised by the defendant in this cross 
appeal has been discussed in respondent's brief under 
the points argued therein but in summary the de-
fendant contends that the two policies should be 
treated as only one, as the plaintiff did in purchasing 
the insurance. The evidence is clear that the build-
ing was in very poor condition at the time the second 
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policy was secured by Mr. Page; that he failed to 
disclose to the defendant, Utah Home Fire Insurance 
Company, its general agent, the nature or condition 
of the building at that time or its immediate In-
tended use, and in that regard violated his fiduciary 
duty to fully disclose all material facts to the insur-
ance company, and the policy was, therefore, voidable 
by the company as a matter of law. It was, there-
fore, error for the court to grant a new trial on 
this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant submits that the plaintiff has 
had a fair trial upon all the issues of the case and 
that a new trial should not be granted on any issues 
but that if a new trial is granted on any issues that 
it should not be granted on the issue of actual cash 
value of the burned fourplex as that has been fully 
and fairly decided on the basis of proper instruc-
tions. 
On the basis of the evidence it is clear as a 
matter of law that Page violated his fiduciary duty 
and that the defendant company is entitled to a 
judgment of no cause of action which should be 
the judgment of this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
604 Boston Building 
Respondent and Cross Appellant 
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